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Writing from a disciplinary base in an ostensibly post-disciplinary 
department of Visual Cultures, deconstruction seemed to 
have had had its day, relegated to the dead-end of a formalism 
that cannot serve renewed faith in creativity (a reading that 
may be slight but has nevertheless held some ground). Yet 
stories of Derrida’s cat now abound in discussions of what 
must now mark one of his most inﬂ uential, even applauded, 
essays, and the reception of ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am 
(More to Follow)’ now readjusts the picture of who or what 
deconstruction addresses.1 Derrida’s essays, now published in 
book form as The Animal That Therefore I am, track the animal/
human distinction as it has infected so much of philosophical 
discourse. This distinction, in the shadow of Descartes’s 
inﬂ uential distinction between reaction and response, banishes 
‘the animal’ to the reactive outside of the distilled responsive 
inner circle of ‘the human.’ Where animal ﬁ gures do show up in 
centre court they are yoked to an allegorical leash, constrained 
to play the human in another guise. This paper assumes some 
knowledge of Derrida’s steps in The Animal That Therefore I am
and follows these in light of the grounds criss-crossed by less 
commented contemporaneous works. These works also afﬁ rm 
animal responses as they differently impact on questions of the 
autobiographical – works by Donna Haraway, Hélène Cixous 
and Carolee Schneemann. They are themselves after Derrida in 
various senses of that phrase, not least in relation to Derrida’s 
redirection of the Cartesian question ‘but as for me, who am I?’
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1) Conference proceedings 
were published as L’Animal 
Autobiographique: Autour 
de Jacques Derrida, Mallet, 
Marie-Louise, ed., Paris: 
Galilée, 1999. Derrida’s 
address is published in 
English as Derrida, Jacques,
The Animal That Therefore I 
Am, trans. David Wills, New 
York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008. The section 
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That Therefore I am (More 
to Follow)’ trans. D. Wills, 
in Critical Inquiry 28 (Winter 
2002), pp.369-418.
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Playing on the present tense of ‘to be’ – indistinguishable from 
‘to follow’ in the French, a simple ‘Je suis’ thus installs a non-
priority and a non-presence in the would-be thinking subject. 
This transformation is intensiﬁ ed through the substitution of ‘The 
Animal’ for ‘I think’: no more the quarantine of ‘I think therefore I 
am.’ What leads me to follow the ﬁ gure of the interspecies kiss 
is the way that it solicits a related question: ‘who are my kin?’ 
The interspecies kiss exacerbates, moreover, what we should 
already know from Derrida: performativity is neither conﬁ ned to 
acts of speech nor to the ability to intend.
In her recent book of encounters, When Species Meet, Haraway 
appreciates the mundane quality of Derrida’s morning encounter 
with his cat, his vigorous efforts to maintain the daily particularity 
of this cat and to hold at bay the allegorical lure that would 
dissolve her catness, as well as his recognition that the cat was 
responding and not only reacting to him, she yet ﬁ nds a failure 
of curiosity in ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am’. For Haraway, 
so much effort goes into addressing the pitfalls that philosophy 
has entrenched in the discourse of species that when it comes 
to this cat, if Derrida is curious about what her response might 
entail, he can ﬁ nd no way to write about it and she vanishes from 
his text as surely as if she were allegory.
Play, and all the incalculable risks it entails, surfaces theoretically 
when Haraway modiﬁ es the register of the question Derrida 
uses to reset our relation to them and disband any further 
variation on the rhetorical theme of ‘can they do what we do?’ 
– the line that Heidegger’s work has so entrenched. Citing 
Jeremy Bentham, Derrida asks ‘can they suffer?’ while Haraway 
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in the scene of Biblical naming. There God lets man (without 
woman) name ‘in order to see’ what happens. This God has both 
an ‘inﬁ nite right of inspection’ but also the ‘ﬁ nitude of a god who 
doesn’t know what is going to happen to him with language.’4
Derrida too does not know what is going to happen when he 
looks ‘just to see’ into the eyes of this cat and in so doing asks 
after himself. Derrida’s being – being present – is troubled not 
conﬁ rmed by this other. Who am I? Such an autobiographical 
question might expect to point the self out, point for point ‘in 
the present’ ‘and in his totally naked truth’.5 Whether by hand, 
by word, by lips or by gaze this pointing does not so much fail to 
deliver but delivers difference not identity. Derrida does not look 
in order to cancel the other by seeing only his own re-conﬁ rmed 
reﬂ ection. Rather, the response of the other always surprises. 
For where autobiography habitually imports a mirror to ﬁ gure its 
reﬂ ective function and lead automatically, autoaffectively back to 
the signing self, ‘The Animal that Therefore I am following’ sees 
itself in the eyes of a cat. It is habitually through the reﬂ ected 
other that the subject is staged for itself as such, misrecognition 
of that subject’s capacities is part of the allure. What if the other 
is wholly other, and not a brother in advance? If this other is 
a cat? Jacques Lacan’s protestations in defence of the human 
purchase on the image notwithstanding, Jacques Derrida is 
himself an autobiographical animal, and he is not alone.
Haraway nevertheless drops the frame of the mirror stage, of 
a strictly specular autobiographical transit, and risks not just 
naming her dog but insists on a non-totalised history of animals 
including those we call domesticated such that domestication 
cannot be deﬁ ned by the ends of ‘man’ alone.   If Derrida’s ﬁ eld 
4) Derrida, ‘The Animal’ p.386.
5) Derrida, ‘The Animal’ p.418.
asks ‘can they play?’2  Yet ‘can they suffer?’ doesn’t simply 
replace something like ‘can they speak? (No? Oh well, let’s kill 
them).’ Rather it joins with Derrida’s reversal and displacement 
of the philosophical refrain of a privation, or lack of an ability as 
contrast to the proper possession of that ability as mark of the 
human. It works the ground of transforming privation into ability 
troubling the sovereignty of power (ability) – they can suffer, 
they can not be able. Thus the grounds of Derrida and Haraway 
don’t quite square, but they should be read together, staggering, 
supplementing each other’s work, especially since play too might 
also trouble the sovereignty of power.
When the cat that therefore Haraway is following disappears, 
she ﬁ nds it substituted by the repetition of a philosophical 
trope trapping Derrida in a scene dominated by its visuality, 
and punctuated by his naked body. He is naked before his cat. 
Naked and ashamed. Yet for all of Haraway’s acknowledged 
Catholic inheritance and transposed secular sense of the word 
made ﬂ esh, following his visual emphasis she loses track of its 
equivocality – the disappearance of the cat hovers between a 
failure of curiosity and an ethical refusal.  On the one hand, she’s 
right – this is about Jacques and not his cat about whom we learn 
very little – but the way it is about Jacques makes a difference. 
Derrida’s phrasing is odd. He writes:
I often ask myself, just to see, who I am-and who I am 
(following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, 
by the gaze of an animal, for example the eyes of a cat.’3
This ‘just to see’ (a repeated phrase) may seek but cannot seize. 
Its curiosity cannot calculate. Later in the essay it is echoed 
2) Haraway, Donna, When 
Species Meet, Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 
2008, p.22.
3) Derrida, ‘The Animal’ 
p.372, italics as original.
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not therefore forever anterior or otherwise inaccessible. Biology 
is not destined to inertia, ﬂ at earth as springboard to culture. ‘Ms 
Cayenne Pepper’ presents a ﬂ ash of the irony familiar from the 
ﬁ rst lines of Haraway’s earlier ‘Cyborg Manifesto’.9 That marital 
blank ‘Ms,’ rather than the anachronistic ‘Miss’ or ‘Mrs,’ might 
initiate the scent of the spectral terror of monstrous lesbian 
reproducibility (in addition to raising ‘Cayenne Pepper’ to the level 
of a name proper to something – someone? – other than a spice). 
And if there is terror, it may only be compounded by the line by 
line realisation that Cayenne is a dog and she is not transformed 
into a man by the humanising virtue of the kiss. They have had 
‘forbidden conversation’: they have had ‘oral intercourse’.10 The 
wet medium of Cayenne’s rich saliva produces an uneven ﬁ gure 
of co-constitution and of reproduction exceeding the dog and the 
woman as transfections pass – or communicate – through viral 
vectors. In so ﬁ guring unlicensed reproducibility and in so ﬁ guring 
co-constituting contact as a contingent rather than appointed 
moment within the dialectical narrative foretold of the human 
subject, Haraway bypasses the necessity to surmount any dead 
fathers in the telos of the law.11 This is not the de-humanisation 
of the sadistic pornographic standard called bestiality, but the 
de-humanism of life.
The interruption in and of the kiss is underlined in Cixous: she 
doesn’t see it coming even though her eyes are open and the 
cat’s determination is ﬂ agged by its ‘clear and decided gaze’. 
For that matter she doesn’t see the cat coming either: ‘in the 
meantime the cat arrived.’12 Pure event, and as such astonishing. 
Not ‘in the beginning’ though this is her ﬁ rst line, rather ‘in the 
meantime the cat arrived.’ Arriving without an article as the 
9) Haraway, Donna, J., ‘A 
Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 
Technology & Socialist 
Feminism in the late 20th
Century’ in Simians, Cyborgs 
& Women: the Reinvention 
of Nature, London: Free 
Association Books, 1991, 
pp.149-182.
10) Haraway, Companion 
Species p.2.
11) Bracha Ettinger’s work 
revises the psychoanalytic 
understanding of the 
unfolding of human 
subjectivity through 
theorising a ‘we’ within the 
formation of the human 
subject traced from inter-
uterine experience. This is 
but one model that the range 
and impact of Haraway’s 




12) Cixous, ‘The Cat’s 
Arrival,’ in parallax, 12:1, 
2006, p. 21.
of research exposes two opposed types of discourse (that of 
science, theory and philosophy reﬂ ecting upon the animal but 
never registering the address of one, versus that of the poets 
or prophets collapsing into identiﬁ cation with animals), Haraway 
catalogues, and therefore impacts on, a different archive calling 
on a range of less discursively regimented work from the 
sciences that adapt or abandon the ﬂ awed concept of the neutral 
observer. Bioanthropologist Barbara Smuts, for example, ﬁ nds 
that her observation of a baboon colony can only proceed when 
she gives up the attempt to be invisible – better put as hostile, 
and learns to adjust her behaviours to those of the baboons who 
certainly are taking note of her.6
Alternating between diaristic while poetically incisive extracts 
from what she names as ‘Notes of a Sportswriter’s Daughter’ and 
more a comparatively more straightforward theoretical address 
Haraway’s Companion Species Manifesto begins somewhat 
provocatively. The very ﬁ rst line tells us that ‘Ms Cayenne Pepper 
continues to colonise all [Haraway’s] cells – a sure case of what the 
biologist Lynn Margulis calls symbiogenesis’.7 (Symbiogenesis I 
take to refer to new ways of thinking about genetic transfers that 
do not necessarily involve linear sexual reproduction). Starting 
off on the other foot – it is Donna Haraway that is ‘colonised’ by 
Cayenne Pepper, by the saliva from her ‘darter-tongue kisses.’8 It 
is the tongue of the other that signs. This ﬁ gure is biological but 
not in a fashion familiar to the devaluation of the mutability of that 
zone in its more normative guises - guises that many a feminist 
may still fear as discourse that cuts destiny to the whim of those 
in power. Indeed Haraway’s work has persistently demonstrated 
that while the biological may be a ﬁ eld riven by power, this ﬁ eld is 
6) Haraway, p.24
7) Haraway, The Companion 
Species Manifesto, Chicago: 
Prickly Paradigm, 2003, p.1.
8) Op.cit.
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On the other hand it is also fraught in the general context of work 
by women so rarely cast as paradigmatic rather than derivative 
– and in dating from the mid-1970’s L’Arrivante like La Jeune Née
marks a time when it was most pressing to challenge alleged 
sexual neutrality.18 The one who arrives should be unmarked 
because unforeseen, a neutral if not neuter arrival. Elsewhere 
Derrida himself reminds us how often the neutral masks the 
masculine: here he remains content with the arrivant.
Cixous, of course, can and does write through the literary 
liberty of free indirect style enabling rapid shifts between 1st
and 3rd person voices, dissolving easy identiﬁ cation or solidity 
of ‘character’ and frequently provoking the question ‘who 
speaks?’ Both ‘she’ and ‘I’ are surprised by the arrival of the 
cat. The question is intensiﬁ ed given the shift in context, the 
grafting of ‘Arrivée du chat’ from an ambiguously ﬁ ctional book 
to a journal context in which we expect the ﬁ rst person singular 
to vehicle the author’s voice, to sign for the author. Provoking 
‘who speaks?’ or ‘who signs?’ usually goes some way towards 
skewing the machinations required for rendering and retaining 
the human subject as central. Here it enables Cixous to pose and 
repose all the clichés of anthropomorphism without falling into 
enunciating them herself, while interjecting with autobiographical 
authority that she had never thought that a cat would show up 
‘in one of my stories’.19 In Cixous the cat can speak – but to 
demonstrate projection, to reveal the error of ‘exaggerating’ 
love.20 In Cixous the ruse that the cat is really an allegory of 
the displaced human partner is voiced to try and ward off the 
animal’s difference and the possibility that the cat is a rival.21
When comings and goings have already circumvented his post, 
18) La Jeune Née usually 
translated as The Newly 
Born Woman though only 
the feminine not the species 
is strictly speciﬁ ed, was 
jointly authored by Cixous 
and Catherine Clément, 
ﬁ rst published in French in 
1975, Paris: Union Générales 
d’Editions, and in English 
in 1986, Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press.
19) Cixous, ‘The Cat’s Arrival’ 
p.21.
20) Cixous, p.32.
21) Cixous, p.24. For 
Anglophone readers ‘the cat 
is a rival’ clearly arises from 
‘The Cat’s Arrival’.
chapter of her novel Messie (1996), ‘Arrivée du chat’ stresses 
arrival even over the cat in a sense that slightly dissipates in 
its recent English translation as a discreet essay called ‘The 
Cat’s Arrival.’ Even so, published in a special issue of the journal 
parallax on ‘animal beings’ ‘The Cat’s Arrival’ has been interjected 
into a ﬁ eld rippling with the after effects of Derrida’s work on 
animals but which has not (yet) kept pace with of that of Cixous. 
Cixous’s cat does not subsequently fade from view, or atrophy 
in allegory, but the stress is on the surprise: she writes ‘I’d also 
never have imagined […] That the Event would be a cat.’13 And 
since arrival is a feminine noun in French, this force of arrival is 
perhaps stressed as feminine while the cat of the title is in the 
generic that is masculine form until the ﬁ rst line of the essay 
when ‘la chatte’ is speciﬁ ed.14
A similar sense of arrival arriving prior to any assignation is used 
by Derrida in his ambiguously wrought term l’arrivant – forgetting, 
he tells us in a footnote, that Cixous had made use of ‘arrivant’
in her novel La (1976) and the next year produced a play based 
on that book called L’Arrivante.15 On the one hand this footnote 
frustratingly contributes to the play of precedence between 
Derrida and Cixous whose works echo each other so much 
anyway not least in the context of deconstruction’s troubling of 
precedence itself – who am I following?16
The door and the shore (‘la rive’) marking the arrival of the 
arrivant – repeating throughout Cixous’s text - redouble this 
problem, as Derrida remarks: ‘this border will always keep one 
from discriminating among the ﬁ gures of the arrivant, the dead, 
and the revenant (the ghost, he she, or that which returns)’.17  
13) Cixous, p. 21.
14) Had the French used 
‘arriver’ as a verb (Le chat 
est arrivé) it would have both 
emphasised the cat and had 
agreement of the masculine 
gender across cat and verb.
15) See Derrida, Jacques,
Aporias, trans. Dutoit, 
Thomas, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993, 
footnote 14, p.86.
16) For a useful  - though 
modest – discussion of these 
overlapping themes in their 
work, see Cixous, Hélène, 
‘Jacques Derrida as a 
Proteus Unbound’ in Critical 
Inquiry 33, Winter, 2007,  pp. 
389-423.
17) Derrida, Aporias, p.35.
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Kisses I, 1981-1988, Inﬁ nity Kisses II, 1990-1998, whose dates 
auto-bio-graph the lives of the cats) and now re-edited into a 
short ﬁ lm (Inﬁ nity Kisses – the Movie, 2008). Schneemann is in 
the photographs, Schneemann signs as artist: Inﬁ nity Kisses is 
legible as autobiographical work as it is traditionally identiﬁ ed – as 
an index of ‘my own,’ and legible within an artist’s work known 
for its investment in the personal, in experience, in a ‘hand-touch 
sensibility’. Does that hand point back to the signing subject, and 
point her out, point for point in her naked truth? ‘Nudity perhaps 
remains untenable,’ remarks Derrida.26 It cannot be held in the 
hand, gathered in a moment of presence. In Schneemann, the 
trope of the mirror is no trap of the same nor agent of shame 
in this work: the eye of the camera so often tropes the I of a 
directing subject but here each blink of the shutter releases an 
other image - image after image of  - what? As Cixous writes: 
‘Woman with cat? Or Woman belonging to cat? Or Cats? Or 
Woman? Or Women? Or the foreigner?’27 Who mirrors whom? 
This is a mirror of technical reproducibility, a mirror that iterates 
– and Schneemann has produced various articulations of these 
photographs re-citing them in different contexts – using her own 
work as a found object. Their eyes are shut in most images, 
even where they are open the inability to predict frame or point 
of focus renders the visual ﬁ eld contingent, no gaze anchors 
a hierarchy. Inﬁ nity Kisses names the work, emphasising the 
performative kisses without consolidating their content. The kiss 
brings to crisis who responds and who reacts without dissolving 
those who kiss into a pool of sameness: kissing is of the edges, 
of continguity not continuity28.
In the kiss, who am I following?
26) Derrida, ‘The Animal,’ p. 
418.
27) Cixous, p. 22.
28) It should be noted 
that both Haraway and 
Derrida explicitly argue 
for a proliferating ﬁ eld 
of differences, such that 
questioning the way in which 
philosophy has posed the 
human/animal divide does 
not result in a disavowal 
of difference. I take this 
ﬁ eld of differences to also 
characterise the works by 
Cixous and Schneemann.
28) It should be noted 
that both Haraway and 
Derrida explicitly argue 
for a proliferating ﬁ eld 
of differences, such that 
questioning the way in which 
philosophy has posed the 
human/animal divide does 
not result in a disavowal 
of difference. I take this 
ﬁ eld of differences to also 
characterise the works by 
Cixous and Schneemann.
that displaced partner – his improper name a literary quotation 
– is reduced to attempting to reinstall proper boundaries. He 
grasps pointlessly at the functioning of doors, hence laws, and 
who should remain before them as a limitless amount of women 
and fantastic beasts traverse this open house, a hippopotamus 
marking the hyperbole.22 Meanwhile the woman comes to offer 
unconditional hospitality to the others to whom she is hostage, 
in spite of Emmanuel Levinas for whom the animal has no face 
and hence no relation to the ethical.23
A mirror crops up in Cixous as a technological supplement of 
shame. The mirror moreover is personiﬁ ed – or ‘animaliﬁ ed’: the 
mirror ‘squawks’ like a parrot, it is ‘perched’ on her shoulder, it 
is repetitious: ‘Naked naked naked see you see you see you,’ 
exacerbated in the phonetically close French: ‘Nus nus nus vus 
vus vus’.24 See you both plural, you both are seen naked, no 
difference: unlike that usually reserved for the animal as naked 
but not knowing it and thus not naked. Cixous is naked in front 
of an animal – the cat and a mirror that speaks like a parrot - and 
like Derrida is ashamed. A moment later the mirror derides her 
in terms that redresses her nakedness as a type of clothing ‘a 
get-up’: ‘look at that get-up it isn’t pretty’ and the mirror installs 
a modesty.25 It is unclear however, that this derision isn’t also 
being addressed to the cat.
For Schneemann, every morning the camera was there ‘just to 
see’, without determination over the image. She had it there, 
ready to hand, by the bed, ready to turn towards her cats, as well 
as toward herself. The ensuing sequences start when Cluny ﬁ rst 
begins to greet Schneemann this way every day, then continued 
by Vesper, culminating in two large sequences of images (Inﬁ nity 
22) The persistence of 
doors and their surprising 
traversal inevitably suggests 
– and revises -  Kafka’s well 
known formulation of the 
condition of the law. Unlike 
the ‘man from the country’ 
the cat passes the door and 
thus retouches the law. See 
Kafka, Franz The Trial, trans. 
Willa & Edwin Muir, New 
York: Modern Library, 1956, 
pp. 267-69. Sue Golding ﬁ rst 
drew my attention to the air 
of Kafka marked by Cixous’s 
door.
23) Numerous writers have 
commented on the glimmer 
of recognition offered by 
‘Bobby the Dog’ to the 
dehumanized prisoners in 
the camps only for Lévinas to 
erase an ethical maxim from 
his barks since the animal 
is ‘too stupid, trop bête’ to 
be able to universalise this 
relation. John Llewelyn cited 
by Cary Wolfe in his ‘In the 
Shadow of Wittgenstein’s 
Lion’ in Wolfe, Cary, ed. 
Zoontologies: The Question 
of the Animal, Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 
2003, p.17.
24) Cixous, Hélène, ‘The 
Cat’s Arrival’ in parallax 12:1, 
p.33. Cixous, Hélène, Messie,
Paris: Des Femmes, 1996, 
p.79.
25) Cixous, ‘The Cat’s Arrival,’ 
p.33.
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